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VIEW ON ASIA briefing
series
Minh Nguyen
September 2004
 Union
of Myanmar (Burma)
Capital: Yangon (Rangoon)
Head of state: Sen. General Than Shwe
Border countries: Thailand, Laos, China, India,
Bangladesh
Myanmar/Burma[1] has had a spurt of foreign
relations controversies ever since it abruptly adjourned its controversial
2004 National Convention to draft a new constitution. In August
2004, Myanmar/Burma was hit by renewed sanctions from the US, faced
being banned from the upcoming Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and its
officials were barred from the 28th Olympic Games in Athens for
its lack of human rights and democracy – a reminder that Myanmar/Burma
still remains one of the most difficult foreign policy challenges
in Asia for the international community.
Myanmar/Burma is situated east of the Andaman Sea and strategically
buffers the world’s two largest populations, China and India.
The country is rich in resources and diverse in its ethnic demography.
A former pariah state in the region and to the world, the military
government of Myanmar/Burma has in recent times opened up the country’s
economy and attempted to build friendly relations with its regional
neighbours. The deepening of bilateral relations with China and
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been particularly
significant, with China now one of Myanmar/Burma’s staunchest
political defenders and top weapons suppliers.
While Australia presently has very little economic interest in
Myanmar/Burma itself, its interest in promoting human rights and
good regional relations should in turn engage Australia’s
foreign policy priorities in the country. With its eyes firmly on
the Asian economies, Australia also has an interest in a politically
stable and confident region. As the military government of Myanmar/Burma
attempts to woo its regional neighbours and prepares to take up
the ASEAN chair in 2006, Australia should be keenly interested in
the regime’s earnestness in delivering democracy and human
rights to its people, conditions which are fundamental for national
unity and stability and therefore the prosperity of the region as
a whole.
Historical overview
Myanmar/Burma’s diverse ethnic mix – with 8 major
ethnic groups and over 100 spoken dialects – is a result of
a long history of migration and conflict along its fluid frontiers.
The Burmans are the ruling Burmese ethnic group that dominates the
country’s military and government.[2]
Most of Myanmar/Burma’s ethnic minorities inhabit areas along
the country’s mountainous frontiers. The largest of the minority
groups are the Karen, who inhabit the lower Myanmar/Burma region;
the Shan, a Thai-related hill people who lives along the Thai border;
the Mon, who are concentrated in the southern part of Myanmar/Burma;
the Chin, who live side-by-side with the Mizoram of India; and Kachin,
a hill tribe people along the Chinese border. Under British colonial
rule (which conquered and ruled Myanmar/Burma for more than a century)
the diverse ethnic minority groups were administered as separate
mini-states known as “Frontier Areas”. British rule
established a complex system of differing treatment for different
ethnic groups, the consequences of which continues to resonate today.
The “divide and rule” strategy of the British Raj entrenched
ethnic nationalist sentiments, which became an impediment to creating
a unified sense of nationhood in Myanmar/Burma following independence
in 1948. Although there were early attempts at creating a federal
political framework for the newly independent Myanmar/Burma, such
plans eventually gave way to a unitary model. The new central government
faced almost immediate armed challenges from political faction groups
and ethnic minorities. The conflict with ethnic groups continued
almost uninterruptedly until cease-fire processes were initiated
just over a decade ago. The Karen, demanding greater autonomy, was
one of the first minority groups to take up arms against the central
government. By the mid-1970s, nearly every major ethnic group was
armed, so that from the birth of an independent Myanmar/Burma, the
military has been engaged in suppressing an ongoing internal rebellion.
The cost has been massive with tens of thousands dead, hundreds
of thousands more displaced, a crumbling economy and a thriving
narcotics trade used to fund the conflict.
The second seed of Myanmar/Burma’s present troubles was sowed
in 1962 when the country’s first prime minister, U Nu, was
ousted in a military coup led by General Ne Win. The coup occurred
shortly after elections that saw the return of the U Nu government
after 2 years of Ne Win’s “caretaker” government.
The military feared that a challenge for constitutional reform by
ethnic minority groups and U Nu’s sympathy towards their concerns
could undermine Burman influence in the frontier areas and could
lead to the breakup of the Union.
The Ne Win regime adopted a policy of economic and political isolation
from the international political economy. This policy enabled Ne
Win to consolidate his political rule and tighten oppression without
scrutiny from the international community. Ne Win dominated the
government until he was forced to step down in 1988 following widespread
riots and student-led pro-democracy demonstrations that grew out
of the government’s sudden devaluation of the national currency.
The military assumed power, declared martial law and brutally suppressed
the demonstrations. Despite this, multiparty elections were held
in 1990 resulting in a decisive victory for the main opposition
National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,
the daughter of independence hero Aung San. However, the results
were never accepted and despite strong international pressure, the
military junta, now called the State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC), continues its grip on power.
The political and human rights situation
Aung San Suu Kyi, NLD Vice-President Tin Oo, and other opposition
members have had various restrictions placed on their activities
since 1989. In 2000 for the second time since the election, she
was placed under house arrest. There were positive signals coming
from the regime by the end of 2001 however, including the restoration
in May 2002 of Aung San Suu Kyi’s freedom of movement, the
continued release of political prisoners and the relaxation of some
of the constraints on the lawful political activities of NLD and
other legal political parties. These gestures followed “confidence-building
talks” between Aung San Suu Kyi and the junta, as the generals
attempted to develop greater cooperation with neighbouring powers
and the international community. Bodies like the International Labour
Organisation (ILO), the United Nations (UN) and Amnesty International
were granted various opportunities to engage the SPDC on its democratic
and human rights record. The SPDC even permitted the UN Secretary-General’s
Special Envoy to Myanmar/Burma, Razali Ismail, and the UN Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar/Burma, Professor Paulo Sergio
Pinheiro, to visit the country on numerous occasions.
However, these positive movements were short lived and a year after
her release Aung San Suu Kyi was rearrested as part of another major
crackdown on the NLD. The SPDC’s latest campaign against its
main opposition followed an incident on 30 May 2003 in which at
least a hundred people were killed when a government-affiliated
group brutally attacked Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade in Depayin.[3]
The international community including ASEAN members swiftly condemned
the human rights violations. Other countries took punitive measures.
The EU and US renewed sanctions, including arms embargo, trade sanctions,
and travel restrictions on senior junta officials. Japan –
Myanmar/Burma’s largest aid donor – suspended new economic
aid, while Australia shelved its human rights workshops for middle-ranking
Burmese officials.
Despite the international community’s reactions, the SPDC
remained defiant, perhaps keen to show Western nations that the
leadership had not been affected by criticisms or punishment. Unwilling
to restore Aung San Suu Kyi’s freedom, the SPDC instead responded
to international and regional pressure with the appointment of General
Khin Nyunt, the head of intelligence who is considered a moderate,
as Prime Minister. Within days the new Prime Minister flagged a
seven-step “road map” towards democracy, which includes
reconvening its “National Convention” to discuss a new
constitution for Myanmar/Burma, the adoption of the constitution
through a national referendum, the holding of elections for legislative
bodies, and the convening of legislative bodies under the new constitution.
The Convention was eventually convened but abruptly adjourned, without
the participation of the NLD, while Aung San Suu Kyi remained under
house arrest. The SPDC continue to ignore its major domestic opponents
and international calls for Aung San Suu Kyi’s release and
genuine dialogue with her party.
The 2004 National Convention represents the third attempt by the
junta to draft a new constitution to replace the 1974 constitution
suspended since 1988. The National Convention began on 17 May 2004
with the participation of delegates handpicked by the junta and
a few representatives from those ethnic groups that had entered
into cease-fire agreements with the junta. The junta left little
doubt about its intentions to remain in national politics. One of
the six objectives of the Convention is “for the Tatmadaw
[the military] to be able to participate in the national political
leadership role of the state”. The Convention was adjourned
at a time when opposition to the Convention had been growing, domestically
and internationally.
As the overall political situation in Myanmar/Burma worsened after
the Depayin incident, so too did its human rights standing. For
the military regime, stability and development have been its primary
obsession. The regime justifies its security measures and its role
in national politics as necessary to maintain national unity and
internal order. The generals are also morally content to draw on
remnants of “Asian values” – the idea that supposed
East Asian cultural values prioritise the interests of the community
over the individual. One of the junta’s Memorandums to the
2003 UN Commission on Human Rights notes that, “The most fundamental
and essential requirement for a country like Myanmar/Burma is to
fulfil [the] basic needs of the people … and also to raise
their standard of living. Other aspects of human rights cannot be
effectively implemented without fulfilling these basic rights.”
Asian values arguments are habitually delivered as a catchall defence
for actual past or present violations of civil and political rights.
Myanmar/Burma continues to be the focus of scrutiny by the international
community for a number of human rights violations associated with
the unruly behaviour of the security forces and the junta’s
reluctance to reform. In the 2004 resolution on Myanmar/Burma’s
human rights records, the UN Commission on Human Rights expressed
its grave concern at “the ongoing systematic violation of
human rights” and listed, among other things, the crackdown
on the NLD and other political arrests and detention, extrajudicial
killings and sexual violence against women, the use of forced labour
including child labour, and violations against religious and ethnic
minorities, especially in areas not under cease-fire agreements.
Suppressing dissent
The issue of political prisoners tops the list of criticisms against
Myanmar/Burma. Before the Depayin incident, the Home Minister reported
that there remained only a hundred political prisoners but this
draws on a limited definition of political prisoners as those who
are members of a political party. However as Pinheiro points out,
the majority of them are students, professionals and other individual
dissidents arrested arbitrarily under security laws and subjected
to unfair trials and due process. Human rights groups continue to
estimate the number of such persons to be between 1200-1300 with
continued arrests and incidents of intimidation, particularly following
the events at Depayin. The latest figures from the government list
153 people arrested following the Depayin incident, including Aung
San Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders, in connection with the Depayin
incident. Pinheiro, however, believes that the real figure could
be much higher.
Another consequence of the Depayin incident has been increased
censorship in an already heavily controlled media environment. Myanmar/Burma
continues to be one of the few countries in the world that censors
every publication through the Literary Works Scrutinising Committee
(LWSC). For added measure, the penalties for accessing unauthorised
information are also severe. According to the International Centre
for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD), ownership
of fax machines and computers as well as access to the internet
without government approval is punishable by a prison term of 7
to 15 years. The SPDC’s vigilance has made Myanmar/Burma third
only to communist North Korea and Cuba in the number of journalists
it holds behind bars.
Conflict with ethnic minorities
While the international community remains focused on the conflict
between the government and its opposition over the 1990 election,
the problem of ethnic separatism represents an equally pressing
challenge for Myanmar/Burma’s move towards democracy and respect
of human rights. While a series of cease-fire agreements have brought
some relief to the junta, fighting still continues. The need to
unify the country remains a powerful argument for the generals in
their hold on power, while armed conflict between the junta and
ethnic rebels remains a principle cause of human rights abuse in
Myanmar/Burma.
Most human rights NGOs continue to report violations and widespread
discriminatory practices in the context of the Tatmadaw’s
counter-insurgency activities directed against ethnic and religious
minorities. Pinheiro’s report in 2003 notes, “Serious
human rights violations have undoubtedly occurred and continue to
occur in the areas where armed groups operate.” One of the
most serious reports, License to Rape released in May 2002 by the
Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) and the Shan Women’s Action
Network (SWAN), alleges systematic and widespread use by the Tatmadaw
of rape and sexual violence as a weapon against the Shan ethnic
minority. The central government continues to deny such allegations
as fabrications but concedes that out of the 173 allegations raised
in the report, 5 were found to be true. Pinheiro had previously
questioned the objectivity and methodology by which the junta had
investigated the allegations.
The use of child soldiers
In the military campaign between the government and ethnic rebels,
both sides are reportedly recruiting child soldiers. The SPDC strongly
denies the use of child soldiers. Its statement at the 2004 UN Commission
on Human Rights claimed that: “Myanmar armed forces is an
all-volunteer force, and those entering military service do so of
their own free will. A person can enlist in the armed forces only
on attainment of the age of 18.” The junta’s sensitivities
came in light of the Human Rights Watch (HRW)’s 2002 report,
which alleges that Myanmar/Burma’s Tatmadaw has more child
soldiers than any other country in the world with as many as 70,000
soldiers under the age of 18. HRW’s investigation found that
the overwhelming majority of Myanmar/Burma’s child soldiers
are in the national army, the Tatmadaw Kyi, which forcibly recruits
children as young as eleven. Once deployed, they are expected to
“engage in combat, participate in human rights abuses against
civilians, and are frequently beaten and abused by their commanders.”
Children are also found in rebel groups, although in far smaller
numbers. While some children were forcibly conscripted, others joined
rebel groups to avenge past abuses by the government against members
of their families or community.
In a report to the Security Council made under resolution 1379,
the UN Secretary-General notes that “testimonies received
by UNICEF [UN Children’s Fund] confirm [HRW’s allegations].
Pinheiro similarly reports that he was able to collect some information
during the 2002 mission “reflecting the existence of child
soldiers in Myanmar” but was hesitant to speculate on the
extent of the problem.
The use of forced labour
In 1930 the ILO established the Forced Labour Convention (ILO
Convention 29). In 1957 this convention was reinforced with Convention
109, the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention. Myanmar/Burma is
a signatory to this convention. An enquiry carried out by the ILO
released in early July 1998 found “abundant evidence”
of pervasive use of forced civilian labour for portering, logging,
agriculture and construction and other work in support of the military.
The ILO report also notes that the Towns Act (1907) and Villages
Act (1908) introduced under British colonial rule made it legal
for the army and police to force people to work. As a result of
international pressures however, Order No.1/99 was issued under
the directive of the SPDC banning forced labour.
In November 2000 the ILO issued a sanction on Myanmar – the
first time the international body had done so under provisions in
its constitution. Bowing again to international pressure, the junta
agreed in May 2003 on a joint “plan of action” with
the ILO to eliminate forced labour. That initiative, which was to
have commenced the following month, was aborted following the Depayin
incident. The ILO had repeatedly warned the junta over its tardiness
in delivering on the pledge to stop using, what the ILO estimates,
more than 800,000 conscripted labour. The ILO gave the junta “a
final opportunity to give practical effect to [their] assurances”
before considering renewed sanctions.
Myanmar/Burma and Australia’s strategy
The human rights and political situation in Myanmar/Burma continues
to fall well short of international law and norms. Many of the domestic
laws and directives criminalise the exercise of certain human rights.
On the other hand the government continues to participate in, or
condone, or is unwilling or unable to guard against the contravention
of certain basic human rights norms, particularly in relation to
its campaign against ethnic insurgencies. The latest crackdown on
the NLD further eroded Myanmar/Burma’s human rights record.
While the SPDC promised a seven-step “roadmap” towards
democracy, there are few reasons for the international community
and opposition forces to believe that the junta is serious about
implementing even its own roadmap so long as Aung San Suu Kyi and
other dissidents remain under detention.
There is international consensus that the junta needs to seriously
engage with the domestic opposition and also discipline the behaviours
of the Tatmadaw Kyi in its counter-insurgency activities. However,
the junta appears to be dragging its feet in addressing both of
these issues. In the context of Myanmar/Burma’s political
stalemate and human rights problems, the international community
has devoted a great deal of energy and resources towards promoting
change but with very little success. The junta has shown that it
is remarkably resilient, even if it is not impenetrable by outside
pressure. Commentators often agree that one of the main reasons
for the international community’s weakness is the lack of
coordinated and concerted action. Currently, international strategies
are divided and inconsistent.
Western nations, particularly the US and EU, advocate sanctions
against the junta’s human rights and democratic failures,
as a way of delegitimising and, to a lesser extent, destabilising
the regime. In contrast, China, India and ASEAN nations advocate
a policy of “constructive engagement” through increased
trade, diplomacy, and foreign linkages in the form of investment
and humanitarian aid, which they argue will gradually encourage
the generals towards the path of democracy. These strategies reflect
the geopolitical differences of Western countries that have very
little interest in Myanmar/Burma, and Asian countries harbouring
postcolonial sensitivities over national sovereignty and geostrategic
and economic ambitions in the resource-rich and underdeveloped country.
In contrast, Australia seems confused over where it stands in relations
to Myanmar/Burma. Like other Western nations, Australia has often
protested loudly about the human rights and political situation
in Myanmar/Burma. However, unlike other Western nations, Australia
is unwilling to take any real action against the junta when it fails
in its responsibility to protect its citizens from human rights
violations. Described as a “wait and see” attitude by
Myint Cho, director of the Burmese Members of Parliament Union (MPU),
Australia does not impose economic or diplomatic sanctions on Myanmar/Burma
and has taken a position of neither encouraging nor discouraging
trade and investment there. Australia’s self-styled “distinctive
foreign policy” on Myanmar/Burma reflects little more than
Asian constructive engagement flavoured with Western rhetoric.
Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer once pointed out that
sanctions would not work without the support of Myanmar/Burma’s
Asian neighbours. It has also been argued that the lack of regional
support for sanctions is what distinguishes Myanmar/Burma from the
anti-apartheid sanction experience in South Africa. While the imposition
of sanctions may have limits in Myanmar/Burma’s case, there
is still no evidence to support the conclusion that constructive
engagement is achieving more. The China/ASEAN approach has similarly
been tried for years without substantive success. Events since Depayin
have now stalled any progress this strategy had hoped to achieve.
Experts generally agree that there is no simple, risk-free solution
to the political and human rights problems in Myanmar/Burma. As
David Baldwin, a Columbia University academic puts it, “there
is no all-purpose instrument that works better in all situations”.
What is sure is that the debate over sanctions has become a distraction
from the real issue. What is more important than taking sides in
this debate or embarking on unilateral foreign policy projects,
is to pursue a strategy that is consistent and coordinated within
a multilateral framework. “It is not that either sanctions
or engagement is a more effective policy than the other”,
Aung San Suu Kyi is reported to have said. “What we need is
concerted effort from the international community to synergise both
strategies to have maximum influence on changes in Burma.”
No matter what strategy Australia adopts, it could be more proactive
in pursuing reform in Myanmar/Burma in cooperation with the EU,
US and regional partners. As negotiations for free trade agreements
with China and ASEAN looms over Australia’s horizon, both
Australia and its near neighbours need to be reminded that regional
stability and prosperity are held at stake by the political impasse
and human rights abuses in Myanmar/Burma. As demonstrated by the
recent row between the ASEAN and the EU over Myanmar/Burma’s
participation in the October 2004 Europe-Asia summit in Vietnam,
instability and the lack of reform in one country could potentially
hurt the entire region.
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[1] Since 1989 the authorities
have promoted the name Myanmar instead of Burma as a conventional
name for their state. The name change is recognised by the UN but
not the US. Australia does not seem to have an official position
on the choice of terminology. Burmese expatriates, including those
residing in Australia, continue to use the old colonial name. This
paper uses both names, attaching no political significance to either
term.
[2] In this paper, “Burmese”
refers to the citizens and expatriates of Myanmar/Burma and to the
official language of Myanmar/Burma. “Burman” refers
to the dominant ethnic group in Myanmar/Burma.
[3] The Burmese opposition refers
to this incident as the “Depayin Massacre” or “Black
Friday”. The Ad Hoc Commission on Depayin Massacre convened
by the National Council of Union of Burma (NCUB) estimated the number
killed could be as high as 282. Affidavits collected for the Commission
hinted at the premeditated and well-organised nature of the attack.
“It appeared that the attackers were systematically trained”,
one witness observed. “They mainly aimed and struck on the
head. Even when I was at a hundred yards, I heard with anguishing
pain, the popping sounds of heads being broken by savage blows.”
Internet resources
Amnesty, Amnesty Annual International Report, http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Burma Brief,
August 2004, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/burma/burma_brief.html
AusAID, Burma Program Details, 14 July 2004, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/
cbrief.cfm?DCon=7603_3421_1124_2053_2981&CountryId=8493641
BBC, Country Profile: Burma, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1300003.stm
Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Burma, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bm.html
HRW, World Report 2003, http://hrw.org/wr2k3/asia2.html
ILO, Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma), Report of the Commission
of Inquiry to examine the observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour
Convention, 1930 (No. 29), 2 July 1998, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/myanmar.htm
Irrawaddy Publishing Group, The Irrawaddy Online Edition, http://www.irrawaddy.org
Mizzima.com: Burma Related News and Issues, http://www.mizzima.com
Myanmar Information Committee, http://www.myanmar-information.net
Myanmar Embassy Canberra, http://www.myanmarembassycanberra.com
New Light of Myanmar, http://www.myanmar.com/nlm
Online Burma/Myanmar Library, http://www.ibiblio.org/obl
Web Monitoring and Documentation of the 60th Session of the UN
Commission on Human Rights, http://www.unchr.info
UNHCHR, Status of Ratifications of Principal Human Rights Treaties,
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf
View on Asia is a publication of the Uniya Jesuit Social Justice
Centre, a research centre based in Sydney’s Kings Cross, Australia.
The views expressed in this report are those of the author. Thanks
to Myint Cho and Jesuit ministries staff for their helpful comments.
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